Mobile Security Fall 2015

Patrick Tague #12: Mobile Malware

[Some slides c/o Tim Vidas, slightly modified]

Carnegie Mellon University

©2015 Patrick Tague

1



- What is mobile malware?
- What makes malware different in mobile?
- Several mobile malware examples

Malware Growth



Source: Lookout State of Mobile Security 2012 Source: Lookout State of Mobile Security 2012 Https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/state-of-mobile-security-2012

• Explosive growth in mobile malware

- Ubiquity of smartphones
- Growing attacker incentives
- Unique opportunities
 - Revenue opportunities
 - Sensitive personal data
- Malware growth
 - Exponential growth in unique samples
 - Skewed towards relatively
 few malware families

What is malware?

- Software with malicious intent
- Common malicious activities [Felt 2011]
 - Collecting user information; Theft of credentials
 - Sending premium-rate SMS/calls (Toll Fraud)
 - Sending spam emails
 - Remote Access Trojans
 - SEO fraud (click-jacking, ad-jacking)
 - Ransomware
 - "drive bys" (sort of)
- Auxiliary features
 - Spreading to other smartphones
 - Evading detection
 - Command-and-control

Android Permissions

- Label for mediating access to controlled resource
- More than 100 built-in permissions
 - Control sensitive phone resources
 - CALL_PHONE, CAMERA, INTERNET, WRITE_SMS, READ_INPUT_STATE, etc.
 - Package signing used to control some permissions
- Mandatory Access Control
 - Permissions declared and requested at install-time
 - Users must grant or deny all requested permissions

Dangerous Permission Combos

- SMS when not needed
 - Toll fraud
- READ_LOGS supersedes many permissions
- INTERNET and READ_CONTACTS
- INTERNET and INSTALL_PACKAGES
- INTERNET and
 ALMOST_EVERYTHING
- Unfortunately many free apps require network so ads can be retrieved



Toll Fraud

Source: Lookout State of Mobile Security 2012 https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/state-of-mobile-security-2012





Carnegie Mellon University

Application Repackaging





Malware Distribution Networks



11

Smartphone Software Lifecycle



Big Problem: Updates



App Distribution

- Android: Android Market
 - Official Google Play market, and several third-party markets
 - Bouncer: Google app scanner for known malware, potentially malicious behavior
- Apple iOS: iTunes App Store
 - Only official iTunes app store
 - Review process: List of guidelines on apps
- Can automated/manual review catch malware?
 - Cat-and-mouse game typical in malware arms race

Unlike Classical Malware...

- Most mobile malware is delivered from an app marketplace
 - By default phones don't allow sources other than the official
- Apps can be set to start automatically after boot, upon SMS arrival_upon installation of another app_really a lot of d
 Massive Security Vulnerability In HTC Android Devices (EVO 3D, 4G,
 Your (Abuild A to be a to be

Malware in Different Markets?



- Official market
 - REALLY low
 - Like a small fraction of a percent



- Alternative markets
 - All over the place

Malware in Different Markets! Findings from market study

- Dist shows malware as a function of total an
 - Plot shows malware as a function of total applications
 - Malware in alternative markets is a significant problem
 - Official market contains 119 malware, or 0.003% of sample



Malicious Updates

- Security software on contemporary mobile devices does not receive elevated system access
 - unlike such software on typical PC
 - Limits accessibility to questionable software
- Application updates may download and install automatically



Bad apps

- Spoofed
 - Netflix
- Repackaged / grafted
 - MonkeyJump
- Spyware
 - Stealth
- Greyware
 - Almost everything else
- Rooting
 - Is ok, but some apps do it when you don't know

Carnegie Mellon University

Example: Zitmo



Dear Customer!

Trusteer is glad to announce the new mobile app which protects your phone while working with online banking, receiving and sending SMS and making calls.

Over 22 millions customers, banks and financial instututions use our programm software to make payments, transfers and other operations securely. If you're working with our software, your security is protected by professionals.

Please chose your phone's operating system:

- O iOS (iPhone)
- C BlackBerry
- Android
- C Symbian (Nokia)
- C Other



Please download "tr.apk"

Continue

Example: App Spoofing

N ET F L I X	
Password Sign In	Password Sign In
Visit <u>netflix.com</u> to sign up. Forgot your password?	

 Netflix only supports certain devices

 But "Netflix" is available for every device!!

Example: Repackaging

- Geinimi
- MonkeyJump

android.permission.INTERNET android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION android.perfinition.extend_FROME_STATE and route permassion BRACESS_COARSE_LOCATION android per haissiber. READis ABOMETSTATEORTCUT android poemiasion ACVESRAFTHE_LOCATION android.permission.CALL_PHONE android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS android.permission.READ_CONTACTS android.permission.READ SMS android.permission.SEND_SMS android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER android.permission.WRITE CONTACTS android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS com.android.browser.permission.WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS android.permission.ACCESS_GPS android.permission.ACCESS_LOCATION android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS android.permission.WRITE SM

<intent-filter android:priority="65535">

<action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED">

</action>

</intent-filter>
Carnegie Mellon University

Example: Repackaging (2)

DroidDream

- * Falling Down
- * Super Guitar Solo
- * Super History Eraser
- * Photo Editor
- * Super Ringtone Maker
- * Super *** Positions
- * Hot ***y Videos
- * Chess
- * 下坠 滚球_Falldown
- * Hilton *** Sound
- * Screaming ***y Japanese Girls
- * Falling Ball Dodge
- * Scientific Calculator
- * Dice Roller
- * 躲避 弹球
- * Advanced Currency Converter
- * App Uninstaller
- * 几何 战机_PewPew
- * Funny Paint
- * Spider Man
- * 蜘蛛 侠



Fake Android Market Security tool delivers more than just a cure for Droid Dream malware

 Your location coarse (network-based) location, fine (GPS) location
 Network communication full Internet access
 Storage modify/delete SD card contents
 Phone calls read phone state and identity
 Services that cost you

Services that cost y money send SMS messages

 System tools change network connectivity, prevent phone from sleeping

Example: NotCompatible



Example: SimpleTemai

- Likely aimed at mobile application promotion systems (click fraud)
 - Download mobile apps from alternative markets
 - Rate the downloaded application
 - Uninstall the downloaded application
- Could consume significant bandwidth
- Grafted into legitimate mobile apps
 - Mostly games
 - Resistant to some automated detection techniques

Carnegie Mellon University

Example: BankMirage

- BankMirage is a cloned banking app that was found in the Google Play store
 - Targets customers of Mizrahi Bank in Israel by putting a wrapper around the legitimate app
- Steals users' IDs (basically phishing)
 - Strangely, doesn't steal their passwords
 - A comment in the malware code explicitly stated the password wasn't to be recorded...
 - App then gives login error and reinstalls legit app

Example: ScarePakage

 ScarePakage is ransomware that locks phone functionality until the user makes a MoneyPak payment

	THE BIFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Contract State	
FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION	
	TextView
	US
	PROHIBITED CONTENT

This device is locked due to the violation of the federal laws of the United States of America

Source: Lookout Top Threats https://www.lookout.com/resources/top-threats/scarepakage

Carnegie Mellon University

To unlock your device and to avoid other legal consequences, you are obligated to pay a release fee of \$500. Payable through GreenDot MoneyPak (you have to purchase MoneyPak card. load it with \$500 and enter the code).

MoneyPak voucher code



Unlock Device Now

Example: BadNews

- BadNews is a malicious SDK that pretends to be an innocent ad network
 - Sends fake news messages, prompts users to install apps with sensitive permissions, sends info back to C&C server
 - Found distributing known AlphaSMS toll-fraud malware
- Evolution of malware using distribution networks, so the apps appear benign

Summary

- Mobile device features make mobile malware significantly different from the PC era
- Most likely, there's a lot of mobile malware out there that we haven't discovered/detected yet
 - Is there a better approach than to continue the cat-andmouse game of malware detection and evolution?

Nov 3: NO CLASS

Nov 5: Mobile Ad Vulnerabilities

Carnegie Mellon University