Efficient Defense and Mitigation of Jamming Attacks

The introduction of software-defined radios into the marketplace allows for new types of software-defined signal processing, communication, and networking techniques to assist in mitigating jamming attacks in a variety of ways. Such approaches often involve the use of cross-layer information to correctly diagnose and repair the protocol stack or to share information and signals through network interfaces. We have studied the use of software filtering mechanisms to identify and eliminate jamming signal at the receiver without obliterating the desired signal, and we have demonstrated the value of such approaches in an SDR testbed implementation. In addition, we have developed cross-layer protocol modifications that use higher-layer indicators of network failure in cases where the attacks cannot be explicitly detected. Toward this end, we have shown that multi-channel communication, multi-path routing, and adaptive transport protocols can be employed to achieve a level of diversity that aids in mitigating jamming attacks, even when jammers are mobile and relatively stealthy.

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Acknowledgements

This research is partially supported by CyLab at Carnegie Mellon University under grant DAAD19-02-1-0389 from the Army Research Office, by the National Science Foundation under grant CNS-1149582, and by an NDSEG fellowship. The views and conclusions contained in print and online are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either express or implied, of ARO, CMU, NSF, or the U.S. Government or any of its agencies.